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In 2008, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists reports, Internet 
journalists comprised the worldwide plurality of imprisoned media workers for the first 
time.  Why are Internet journalists subject to higher levels of repression than journalists 
working other medium?  My arguments build on literature concerning institutional 
mechanisms of control in authoritarian regimes, violent conflict and social movement 
repression.  In this report I examine Egypt from 2004 through 2008, a period of high 
political activism and a corresponding rise in state repressive action.  Five years of 
English-language wire service news reports indicate that a greater percentage of bloggers 
in Egypt were victims of state repression than print journalists over this period.  This 
pattern can be explained in party by corporatism in the print media sector and journalists‟ 
involvement with opposition movements.  Finally, it appears that the state is using the 
judicial system as a mechanism of punishment; adding to the growing body of literature 
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In 2008, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists reported that Internet 
journalists comprised the worldwide plurality of imprisoned media workers for the first 
time.
1
  Such a statistic gives pause to those that question the political impact of bloggers 
and others who use the Internet to share information to shed light on current events.  Do 
authoritarian regimes, those that are most likely to take repressive action against 
members of the press, see the bloggers‟ activities as a serious threat to their power?  Are 
bloggers political activists, have they fomented social movements in some places?  Or, 
are bloggers simply inviting higher levels of repression by substantially going beyond the 
norms of political speech?  In short: what explains the higher level of repression against 
bloggers? 
Political scientists and others who remain skeptical of the political impact of blogs 
raise important points: the vast majority of weblog authors worldwide do not address 
political topics and, of those that do, few regularly update their sites for extended periods 
of time.  Additionally, in much of the developing world access to technology is low; 
bloggers in these countries have small domestic readerships and are thus limited in the 
number of opinions their writings might change or the number of individuals they might 
mobilize.  Nonetheless, the governments of the world have responded to those who use 
                                               
 1  The Committee for the Protection of Journalists, “CPJ‟s 2008 prison census: Online and in jail,” 








this novel media to share political information and opinions with the highest level of 
repression. 
The Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ) identifies Egypt in its 
report about this emerging trend.  At the end of 2008, according to the CPJ, one Egyptian 
media worker was in prison.  Abdel Kareem Nabil Suleiman began a four-year prison 
sentence in November 2006 for using his blog to voice criticism of al-Azhar, the 
prominent Islamic university in Cairo, and President Hosni Mubarak.
2
  His case and the 
birth of the Egyptian „blogosphere‟ more generally caught the attention of many in the 
western media and some in the academy.  Suleiman may have been the lone Egyptian 
blogger in jail at the end of 2008, yet other major stories of state action against bloggers 
and print journalists indicate that repression in this country is more wide-spread than 
reported. 
In this paper I use the Egyptian case to study the worldwide snapshot offered by 
the CPJ.  The five year period from the rise of the Egyptian Movement for Change (also 
known as Kefaya, meaning „enough‟) in 2004 through the events surrounding the 2008-
2009 Israeli war on Gaza has been characterized by high levels of both contentious 
politics and repressive response from the state.  These events enable me to examine state 
treatment of bloggers and print journalists in a more in depth manner, as well as across 
time.  Have more bloggers suffered repression at the hands of the Egyptian state than 
print journalists?  Are there differences in the type or degree of repression employed 
                                               
 2  The Committee for the Protection of Journalists, “2008 prison census: 125 journalists jailed” 







against these different classes of journalists?  How does the interaction of media and 
social movements shape the response of the state? 
I seek to answer these questions in three sections.  First, I examine two strains of 
political science literature that explore the causes of repression and provide useful bases 
for developing hypotheses about the causes of variation in repression across journalistic 
media.  Many works on „enduring authoritarianism,‟ a response to works on 
democratization, explore the relationship between repression and institutions.  
Governments reorganize old institutions or build new ones in order to embed opposition 
leaders and movements in the state.  I argue such institutional methods of restricting 
political behavior may apply to journalists as well.  A second literature explains violence 
during contentious politics and more severe instances of conflict.  In such periods, 
violence, ranging from detention to homicide, may be “indiscriminate” or “selective.”  
Explanations of “selective” violence, the specific targeting of dissidents and other 
transgressors, offer particular insight into the choices states make in targeting certain 
journalists and not others with repressive mechanisms.  Through this critical examination 
of the literature I develop specific hypotheses about the determinants of state repression. 
Next, I turn to the specifics of Egyptian politics, media and repression between 
2004 and 2008.  I begin by examining recent developments in Egypt through secondary 
sources.  This picture provides me with the context necessary to examine specific patterns 
of repression against print journalists and bloggers.  Subsequently, I collect and present 
data on repression of the Egyptian print and Internet journalists.  Reports from three 







question in this analysis and learn about the tactics the Egyptian state deploys against 
them.  I use these data to test the hypothesis developed in the first section.  In the final 
section of the paper, I use the theory and evidence from the earlier chapters to draw 
tentative conclusions about the broader implications of this research and offer directions 









Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
There are proverbs in many languages about the relative strength of the pen and 
the sword.  Napoleon Bonaparte saw this relationship in light of the mass media; he is 
credited with saying that “four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand 
bayonets.”
3
  Yet, this quotation alone does not indicate whether he refers to his means of 
control over those who lived in France or, more likely, to the ways in which the populace 
sought to threaten his hold on power.  Political Science has long recognized the tension 
between the power of the pen and the sword, and the efforts of both the state and society 
to maintain and expand their power through discourse and violence.  This chapter seeks 
to further elucidate this relationship, in light of new technologies, through examining 
literature about the media and politics, enduring authoritarianism and political violence. 
 
Politics and the Mass Media 
The birth of the Internet led to a flurry of predictions by politicians, political 
commentators and academics about the beneficial changes the new technology might 
precipitate around the world.  Those who focus on existing democracies argue that the 
Internet can make debate fuller, more pluralistic and ultimately lead to more 
representative policy outcomes.  Those who focus on the decline of authoritarianism see 
                                               
 3  Louis Edward Ingelhart, Press Freedoms: A Descriptive Calendar of Concepts, Interpretations, 







the Internet as a tool dissidents can use to secretly develop (pro-democratic) ideas, 
mobilize contentious politics and then unleash social movements only after they are too 
large and powerful for regimes to crush.
4
 
The optimistic expectations about the effect of the Internet on democracy and 
democratization are based on assumptions about both the nature of new media and the 
way it will be used.  The most nuanced examples of this argument rest explicitly on 
Jürgen Habermas‟s arguments about the public sphere.
5
  The public sphere, as a concept, 
is principally viewed as a discursive space, composed of face-to-face discussion and 
debates in the mass media, which brings the people of a democracy together to deliberate 
on the issues of the day.
6
  The Internet, they say, provides the potential for many-to-many 
communication in a way that could replicate, and some argue even improve upon, the 
face-to-face discussions Habermas pointed to in the coffeehouses and salons of 
eighteenth century Europe. 
The optimists also assumed that the Internet would quickly become available to 
many and that this collection of individuals would choose to use the Internet for political 
purposes.  More serious scholars of the public sphere, however, recognize that 
individuals interact with media technology, thus shaping its social and political impact.  
                                               
 4  Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet 
on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 1-5. 
 5  It is perhaps relevant that the release of the first English-language translation of his major work on 
this topic came at the end of the twentieth century.  Thus the revival of this approach in the American 
academy coincided with the emergence of the Internet as a topic of study in social science literature.  
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1989 [1962]). 
 6  Ibid; see also Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the 







Habermas felt the public spheres he studied “dissolved” when people stopped 
participating in debate after mass media mixed the political and entertainment, and as the 
importance of corporations increased in society.
7
  Excluded voices may sometimes bring 
overlooked issues and viewpoints to broader attention as a result of changing media 
technologies.  More often, however, political and economic elites will take advantage of 
changes and further dominate the discussion.
8
  Many states limit the access of the citizens 
have to the Internet.  Commercial interests are also becoming powerful online actors.
9
  In 
addition, the diversity of opinions and heterogeneity of Internet users across the globe is 
leading to social fragmentation rather than unifying political debate.
10
  The absence of 
improved and new electronic democracies around the world demonstrates the inaccuracy 
of such assumptions. 
The errors made by such optimists are not a reason to discount the role of the 
press in political outcomes.  Political scientists, like Napoleon, have recognized the 
power states may gain through the use of and control over information sharing 
institutions and mechanisms.  Benedict Anderson, who coined the phrase “print 
capitalism,” is well-known for offering a thesis about the importance of the printing press 
                                               
 7  Ibid., 140. 
 8  Ibid., 175-176; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1992), 109-142; Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics,” Public Culture 14, no. 1 
(2002): 49-90. 
 9  Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain, eds., Access Denied: The 
Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Habermas, 175-176; Zizi 
Papacharissi, “The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere,” in New Media and Society 3, no. 1 
(March 2001), 9-27. 
10  Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community and Accelerated 
Pluralism,” in Polity, 31, no. 1 (Autumn 1998), 133-160; Leah Lievrouw, “Our Own Devices: Heterotopic 
Communication, Discourse, and Culture in the Information Society,” in The Information Society 14, no. 2 







in the rise of nationalism.  Anderson was not the first to credit mass media the ability to 
foster a sense of community; in 1958, Daniel Lerner anticipated this line of thought.  In 
his work on the modernization of the Middle East Lerner writes that the expansion of 
“psychic mobility” enabled a larger number of people than ever before to “imagin[e] 
themselves as strange persons in strange situations, places and times.”
11
  Lerner argues 
that long-distance travel and mass media – beginning with the novel and later, radio and 
television series, as well as movies – enabled average people “to imagine how life is 
organized in different lands.”
12
  These developments led people to better understand 
those who were different and also to recognize the similarities that exist across cultures 
leading to a common worldwide identity.
13
 
Anderson‟s work offers a similar understanding of the power of the press, while 
moving away from the universalism of Lerner‟s approach.  For Anderson, capitalism in 
combination with the printing press created a commercial market for printed media.  
These materials led to the development of common European languages among people 
who previously knew only the vernaculars of their small localities.
14
  Thus, those who 
lived in the broader territories that became today‟s European nation-states could 
„imagine‟ a “deep, horizontal comradeship” with those whom they shared a language 
despite never having any contact with the vast majority of those in their community.
15
 
                                               
11  Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free 
Press, 1958), 52. 
12  Ibid., 54. 
13  Ibid., 52-54. 
14  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso 1991), 5-7, 44-46. 







The new European nation-states promulgated these “imagined communities” at 
home and in their colonies, according to Anderson.  New modes of transportation, 
primarily railroads, increased the connection between the center and the periphery, 
modern bureaucracies and centrally-coordinated education systems expanded the ability 
of the state to mediate language.  These institutions further deepened the hold of common 
languages across the territories controlled by a central state.
16
  Scholars who follow 
Anderson recognize the importance of „print-capitalism‟ in providing the mass media a 
central role in the creation and maintenance of the modern system of nation-states born in 
Europe and in spreading this system through imperialist practices around the globe.
17
 
When the state does not control mass media, they can become the means by 
which people challenge the state and other dominant actors in society.  Indeed, Anderson 
cites Martin Luther‟s theses, which challenged the authority of the Catholic Church, as 
among earliest examples of print-capitalism.
18
  He credits the works of this pivotal author 
in European history with tripling the number of books published in German during the 
first half of the sixteenth century and describes Luther as “the first best-selling author.”
19
  
Sidney Tarrow expands on Anderson‟s thesis about the role of mass media in building 
popular politics.  For Tarrow mass media fostered „imagined communities‟ which in turn 
allowed people to “join across wide social and geographic divides in national social 
                                               
16  Ibid., 115-116. 
17  SEE: James Gelvin, “Modernity and its Discontents: on the Durability of Nationalism in the Arab 
Middle East,” Nations and Nationalisms 5 (1999); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements 
and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
18  Anderson, 39-40. 









  Newspapers, Tarrow argues, have long been key mechanisms for the 
creation of communal identity and contentious politics.
21
 
Scholars who focus on authoritarian regimes note that states maintain similar 
levels of control over the Internet and more traditional media.  Three reasons explain this.  
First, usage levels in much of the developing world remain low; in many places this is 
because states keep prices artificially high.  The wealthy, who have access to the Internet 
in such circumstances, already have access to alternate sources of information through 




Additionally, states invest in technologies for filtering the Internet content those 
within their borders can access.  The strength of these measures does vary across 
countries, but Internet filtering has largely kept pace with the technological means for 
circumventing state attempts to restrict access.  Although the most determined and 
technologically savvy bypass the filtering technology, the vast majority of Internet users 
surf the Internet within limits the state determines.
23
  Authoritarian states make analog 
efforts to the electronic filtering of the Internet.  Some states block international 
periodicals and satellite channels from entering their borders after uncomplimentary or 
otherwise objectionable material is published or broadcast.  Reports indicate that some 
                                               
20  Tarrow, 44. 
21  Ibid., 45-47. 
22  Kalathil and Boas, 142. 











Finally, authoritarian regimes employ legal and extra-legal methods to punish 
those who share information online much as they do to those who produce content for 
more mainstream media.  Singapore, for example, passed new laws in the early 1990s to 
regulate Internet use and prosecutions under this law in the next century followed on the 
heels of similar prosecution of international newspapers.
25
  In Egypt, one of a very few 
Arab countries without systematic Internet filters, the state has sought to encourage self-
censorship online through the use of a “few well-publicized crackdowns.”
26
  The regime 
employs similar techniques for promulgating self-censorship among print journalists, 
using “repression and brutality against dissenting journalists” to create an environment of 
fear and encourage self-censorship.
27
 
I return to the particulars of the Egyptian case in the second chapter.  For now, the 
point remains that states recognize that they can enhance their own power through the use 
of media.  At the same time, however, those who seek to challenge the state can also 
strengthen their position through the use of media.  States, particularly of the 
authoritarian variety, therefore seek to limit the uses of the media by the public.  In the 
next two sections I review literature concerning the role of institutions and information in 
                                               
24  Kalathil and Boas, 121. 
25  Gary Rodan, “Asia and the International Press: The Political Significance of the Expanding 
Markets” in Democratization and the Media, ed. Vicky Randall (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 
125-154; Cherian George, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in 
Malaysia and Singapore (Seattle: Singapore University Press, 2006). 
26  Kalathil and Boas, 106. 
27  Mamoun Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World (Westport, CT: 







violent conflicts to devise hypotheses about the particular mechanisms authoritarian 
states use to limit information sharing across two media – print journalism and blogging. 
 
Institutions and Authoritarianism 
At the end of the twentieth century, much comparative politics literature 
examined the causes of democratization.  This focus was the result of real world 
conditions, known as the third wave of democratization.  The five volumes authored by 
Guillermo O‟Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead tracked the transitions 
in Southern Europe and Latin America.  The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 further 
corroborated the transitions paradigm and provided more cases to explore the causes of 
democratization. 
Other scholars recognize that the democratic transitions are not inevitable and 
believe the discipline focuses on potential signs of transition at the expense of other 
important political phenomena.  Lucian Pye, for example, encourages his fellow members 
of the American Political Science Association to examine the “crisis of 
authoritarianism.”
28
  He argues that technology and modernization, more generally, 
require authoritarian regimes to change the ways in which they have used the tools of 
coercion and legitimacy to maintain control.
29
  Scholars of regions where evidence of 
democratization was largely absent took up his call and asked: what are the reasons that 
authoritarian regimes endure?  Many of those who offered answers point to both the role 
                                               
28  Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism” in The American Political 
Science Review 84, no. 1 (Mar 1990), 3-19. 







institutions of repression and institutions for controlling the spread of information play in 
strong authoritarian states. 
Robert Dahl‟s classic work, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, remains the 
starting point for many discussions of both democratization and enduring 
authoritarianism.
30
  Dahl provides a thorough definition of democracy or rather, 
polyarchy.  These various characteristics can largely be represented by two dimensions, 
that of “public contestation” and “the right to participate.”
31
  Polyarchies are those 
regimes that score highly on both dimensions, while in “closed hegemonies” leaders are 
not chosen openly, nor are citizens able to participate in the process.
32
 
Dahl offers two different variables to explain regime transitions.  He assumes that 
the inclusion of forces opposed to the current government drives democratization.  Dahl 
argues governments permit different levels of inclusion in response to changes in the 
“costs of toleration” and the “costs of repression.”
33
  Polyarchies are most likely to 
emerge when the costs of toleration fall below those of repression.  Authoritarian 




Dahl‟s analysis leaves important questions unanswered: what determines 
changing costs of repression and toleration?  Pye wrote that technological change is one 
factor that leads authoritarian regimes to change tactics of control.  Blogs, unlike printed 
                                               
30  Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1971). 
31  Ibid., 5. 
32  Ibid., 7. 
33  Ibid., 15. 







media, do not offer a physical document and most bloggers do not have official office 
space or editors, like most newspaper and magazine reporters.  Structural differences like 
these that vary across media relocate the border between state and society.  As a result the 
effective tactics of control available to the state change and likely come with different 
costs.  Jill Crystal and Eva Bellin examine the tools available to the authoritarian regimes 
in the Middle East and shed light on the relative price tags of these tactics.
35
 
Many scholars consider the repressive arm of Middle Eastern states to be strong 
and point to the unique role that “police, jails and fear” play in maintaining regimes of 
the region.
36
  Crystal dates the emergence of such a system to the colonial period and 
argues that coercive institutions “seem to develop their own momentum.”
37
  She further 
argues that technological changes do not pose a challenge to the state, but rather enhance 
its surveillance powers and violence, reducing costs and allowing the military and 
security services to grow larger and stronger.
38
  Bellin agrees that the Middle Eastern 
regimes tend to have strong coercive apparatuses, but argues consistent economic support 
dispersed through patronage ties within these institutions, rather than institutional 
„stickiness,‟ cause pro-authoritarian behavior by the military and security services.
39
 
Bellin further argues that the costs of building and maintaining strong repressive 
institutions are not the only ones faced by regimes.  Costs also increase with the size of 
                                               
35  Jill Crystal, “Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World,” World Politics 46, no. 2 (Jan 
1994); Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (Jan 2004). 
36  Crystal, 263. 
37  Ibid., 282. 
38  Ibid., 282-283. 







the opposition that must be repressed.  Large-scale violent repression is a cost states 




States use institutions to prevent the emergence of such challenges, thus reducing 
the need for repression.  Governments resort to violent methods only when institutional 
mechanisms fail to curb threatening behavior.  According to Crystal, states use 
patrimonial social structures, such as the „primordial‟ ties of tribe and sect, as well as 
socio-economic cleavages, to distribute economic incentives and build support.  States 
use these incentives and their ability to withhold them from certain groups, to encourage 
social groups themselves to discourage and even police dissent.
41
 
Such informal, or at least less official, patrimonial networks do exist and 
strengthen many authoritarian regimes.  Bellin points to them in her discussion of the 
military, however, she privileges the relationship between civil society and the state over 
socioeconomic cleavages in explaining the institutional methods of control.  Bellin agrees 
with many regional specialists; Arab governments neutralize the threat posed by civil 
society by corporatizing emergent groups.  Governments corporatize social groups by 
enmeshing them in existing government institutions in order to monitor and shape the 
behavior of these groups.
42
  When such tactics do not fully protect the regime, I expect 
that it employs violent repression for protection. 
                                               
40  Ibid., 146-147. 
41  Crystal, 269-277. 







Bellin‟s discussion of formal institutions with the goals of incorporating civil 
society is most useful for thinking about the institutional factors that might mediate 
between the state and the media.  Challenges to existing institutional patterns of control 
are not just seen as a result of rising new media like the Internet, but also within the 
existing print media.  Many authoritarian regimes own and operate much of the media 
within the borders of their country.  State-owned media is the extreme example of 
embedding this social force in the state. 
Today, Daniela Stockmann and Mary Gallagher report authoritarian regimes are 
increasing the levels of commercialization allowed in their domestic media.
43
  The two 
authors argue that China and other regimes allow, and even encourage, media 
commercialization; while the proportion of state-owned media declines, institutions retain 
power over new newspapers and television stations.  The boundaries of discourse expand 
slightly, thereby increasing public trust in the media, but the core content remains the 
same.
44
  Commercialization does shift the balance of state-society relations, but this 




In conclusion, institutional mechanisms are an important way for states to reduce 
the costs of repression.  Institutions, like those in China, continue to constrain the 
                                               
43  Daniela Stockmann and Mary E. Gallagher, “Remote Control: How the Media sustains 
Authoritarian Rule in China,” paper presented at Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin 
(24 Feb 2009); SEE ALSO: Daniela Stockmann “Media Commercialization under Authoritarianism: Does 
Regime Type Matter for Liberalization?” paper presented at 2009 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association (1-5 April, 2009). 
44  Stockmann and Gallager, 6-8. 







commercial press at levels similar but not identical to those in the state owned media.  
Unlike their counterparts who write for independent or state-owned newspapers, bloggers 
will be less embedded in state institutions.  Where institutions are not as effective, states 
must pay the higher costs associated with repression. 
 
Conflict: Civil war and movement repression 
Studies of war and movement repression fall under the general heading of 
conflict.  Both areas of study contain lessons for understanding repressive action against 
journalists and bloggers.  State repression against non-violent social movements appears 
very different from classical civil wars between similarly equipped and staffed armies.  
Civil wars, however, are often fought between asymmetrically armed groups, making the 
line between a guerilla force engaged in civil war with the state and a social movement 
that employs violent tactics a blurry one. 
Stathis Kalyvas tackles a number of big questions in his recent book on violence 
during civil war.  The model he develops to explain “selective violence,” offers insight 
into the states‟ repressive actions against journalists.  Kalyvas defines violence as “the 
deliberate infliction of harm on … noncombatants or civilians” and includes a wide range 
of behaviors under this definition:  “Pillage, robbery, vandalism, arson, forcible 
displacement, kidnapping, hostage taking, detention, beating, torture, mutilation, rape and 
desecration of dead bodies.”
 46
  Often during war these acts are carried out to gain control 
                                               








over territory and encourage certain behavior among the populace.
47
  Other times, 
however, dissidents are targeted because of actions they have already taken against a 
particular armed force.  It is this phenomenon that Kalyvas terms “selective violence.”
48
 
Kalyvas argues that there are two main, interrelated determinants of selective 
violence during civil wars: territorial control and availability of information.  Each side in 
a war will have full, or near full, control over some physical territory.  Where a side has 
support and power, few civilians are likely to defect and thereby become potential targets 
of selective violence.  Outside of these strongholds, the proportion of power each side 
wields will vary and where control is lower the costs involved in seeking out a particular 
transgressor are higher.  Control also impacts the rate of denunciation, the main source of 
information; civilians are most likely to denounce when the force they aid has a 
preponderance of control over their territory.  Thus, the armed forces will engage in the 
highest levels of selective violence in territory where they hold the majority, but not all of 




In stable authoritarian regimes, with the occasional exception of certain regions, 
territorial control is reasonably high.  The ability of states to gather information about 
journalists and bloggers, however, does vary.  In order to target a specific journalist or 
blogger the regime must know about the offense, its presumably dangerous content, know 
who wrote it and know where to find them.  Many have argued that the Internet enables 
                                               
47  Ibid., 26-28. 
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individuals to more easily share their ideas without divulging their identities.
50
  
Journalists working in the print media may also choose to protect their identities, 
particularly when bringing a dangerous story to light.  Therefore, we may expect the state 
to have more difficulty learning about and using selective violence against any journalist 
or blogger who writes anonymously. 
Christian Davenport‟s extensive body of work on state violence addresses 
somewhat different phenomena, but offers similar insight.  In one article, he finds that the 
actions of the social movement impact when regimes choose to employ repression against 
social movements.  States are more likely to repress a social movement when the 
frequency of protests increases or the variety of strategies used by the movement to 
express dissent increases.  In addition to the raw frequency with which groups engage in 
protests, social movements that protest more frequently than the culturally accepted 
threshold will more likely find themselves victims of state repression.
51
 
Bloggers and print journalists, especially those who author op-ed columns, 
frequently take on a particular issue area or write from a particular political ideology.  
Many further maintain alliances with political parties or social movements that work for 
the same ideas and causes.  By lending their support to those who organize contentious 
politics against the regime, these journalists and bloggers are in effect adding to the 
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tactics through which the parties and movements are challenging the regime.  In doing so, 
these individuals increase the chance that the state will use repression against them. 
 
Conclusions and Hypotheses 
This chapter has examined the ways in which current political science literature 
can elucidate our understanding about why and when authoritarian regimes employ 
repressive action against journalists.  In particular I have examined two relationships, 
first, that between institutions and repression and, second, that between conflict and 
repression to explore how they might inform the patterns of repression against journalists 
across different media.  Three hypotheses can be derived from this discussion; they are: 
H1: Because states use less coercive power to control groups they have co-opted, 
journalists working in media embedded in state institutions will experience less 
repression. 
H2: States must know the identity of an individual in order to carry out „selective 
violence,‟ therefore journalists that write anonymously are less likely to be victims 
of state repression. 
H3: Social movements and opposition parties that employ various strategies to 
challenge the power of the state invite punishment; therefore states will be more 
likely to punish those journalists with ties to social movements or political parties. 
These three hypotheses will be tested in the next chapter by examining the ways in which 









Chapter 2: Evidence and Analysis 
On the 25
th
 of January 2007 an Egyptian court sentenced a blogger to jail for the 
first time.  Abdel Kareem Nabil Suleiman, a twenty-four year old Alexandria-native, 
known on his blog as Kareem Amer, began a four year stint in the Borg al-Arab prison: 
three years were punishment for insulting Islam and the remaining year was for insulting 
the president.  Suleiman spent the two and a half months between his initial arrest and the 
beginning of his trial in solitary confinement and his family was denied visitation rights.
52
  
Similar conditions were enforced between the first trial and the time when the appeals 
court issued its decision, upholding the ruling of the lower court.
53
  Two-years into his 
prison term, according to Reporters Without Borders, this young man had not once been 
allowed to see his parents.
54
 
Less than a year after this benchmark event, the Egyptian government accused 
one of the country‟s most prominent print journalists, Ibrahim Issa, of insulting the 
president and making false statements about his health.  Issa is an editor at al-Dustour, a 
daily independent newspaper published in Cairo.  He spent the next year free on bail 
awaiting the decisions of the criminal court – six months and a fine – and the appeals 
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court, which reduced the prison term to two months.
55
  A few days after the appeals court 




On their face these two examples of state repression are very different.  Suleiman 
is a young blogger who sought to protect his identity, while Issa is an established and 
well-respected journalist.  Suleiman was incarcerated and isolated during his trial and 
after his conviction.  Issa, on the other hand, never saw the inside of a prison cell, thanks 
in part, to the direct intervention of the Egyptian president. 
The similarities between these two stories, however, should not be overlooked.  
Sulieman and Issa were punished, different outcomes aside, through the legal system 
under the strong libel laws found in Egypt.  More substantively they do not present 
instances of variation on two of the three hypotheses I present above.  Neither man was 
embedded in the state, nor is either an active member of an opposition party or social 
movement. 
In this chapter I explore the similarities and differences in cases of state 
repression in light of the hypotheses posed above.  I first examine the recent character of 
contentious politics and the state of the media environment in Egypt.  Second, I present 
data gathered from three western wire services – Agence France Press, Associated Press, 
and United Press International.  These news outlets reported on fifty two cases of state 
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repression against journalists and bloggers over the five years from 2004 through 2008.  
This period encompasses the birth of a new social movement, The Egyptian Movement 
for Change – Kefaya – and emergence of blogging as a political phenomenon.  The 
variation I observe between the experiences of these journalists or bloggers, including 
Suleiman and Issa, the two most covered cases, sheds light on the hypotheses presented 
above. 
 
The Egyptian Political Climate: Rise of a new protest culture 
The first decade of the twenty-first century in Egypt was marked by a period of 
high political activism.  The new protest culture pushed the boundaries of acceptable 
political speech.  Journalists, as observers and sometimes as participants, were caught up 
in the crackdowns triggered by these events.  The data collected for this paper cover five 
years of this period of contention, 2004 through 2008.  This section will briefly provide 
some historical context for the events of these years, before exploring those of concern in 
more depth. 
Protests are not a new phenomenon in Egypt, although their prominence has 
waxed and waned through out the country‟s history.  In considering the period after the 
1952 Free Officers Revolution, the contentious politics of the 1970s provide the strongest 
parallel to the events of the twenty-first century.  In the early-1970s there was a very 
active student movement agitating for confrontation with Israel.
57
  After the war in 1973, 
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the tenor of the protests changed and the students voiced criticisms of the political and 
economic situation in Egypt. 
The 1979 university law and the 1981 imposition of a state of emergency severely 
restricted protest activity to non-public spaces.  The state allows protestors to gather 
inside the walls of universities, mosques, political party offices and professional 
syndicates.  With a few exceptions, the police have not entered the grounds of these 
institutions to break up protests.  Instead, the police are deployed around the buildings 
and campuses during these events to prevent agitators from spilling into the streets and 
encouraging others to join in.
58
 
Brief periods of protest continued to occur, despite these legal changes.  
Economic grievances and international events triggered occasional moments of 
contention during the 1980s and 1990s.
59
  Unlike these more isolated events, the 
contentious politics of the current century follow a pattern similar to those of the 1970s; 
the first demonstrations were triggered by international events and later protesters took up 
issues of domestic Egyptian politics, in doing so they expanded the limits of public 
debate. 
The Second Intifada began in fall of 2000, this new wave of violence between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis provoked outrage across the Arab and Muslim world.  
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Students in Cairo reacted quickly, holding protests in support of the Palestinians and 
attempting to march on the Israeli Embassy in the October 2000.  This round of protests, 
however, quickly faded.
60
  Passions were reignited in Egypt and elsewhere when the 
Israelis began a new offensive and invaded Ramallah in March 2002.  A number of the 
protests held in Alexandria and Cairo brought out 9,000 to 10,000 participants.  
According to one report, the Cairene participants came from a broader swath of society 
than previous protests; students from smaller and less politically active student bodies 
marched along side students from Cairo and Ain Shams Universities.
61
 
A year later, in March of 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, prompting another 
round of protests in Egypt and other Arab countries, as well as many other places around 
the world.  On March 20 an unusual crowd, composed of “stylish AUC students, 
hardened activists, Islamists and passersby” took over the main downtown square in 
Cairo, closing the normally congested traffic circle to traffic.
62
  The protest was in part 
aimed at the United States.  Demonstrators did push toward the American Embassy, not 
far from the square, but were held back by Egyptian police and security forces.
63
 
The protest on this day went further and broke an unwritten rule of political 
speech in Egypt.  Criticism of policies, parliament and the bureaucracy is acceptable and 
accusations of corruption in these quarters are often quite vibrant.  The President and his 
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family, however, are generally understood to be off limits to public criticism.
64
  Those 
protesting the Iraq war yelled slogans calling for Mubarak to leave office, explaining that 
“„millions hate him.‟”
65
  The next day police attempted to keep the protesters away from 
the square, an attempt which resulted in clashes between security forces and 
demonstrators across the downtown area.  Later in the day these groups converged, 
marched down a main thoroughfare along the Nile, burned a photograph of Mubarak in 
front of the headquarters of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), and were only 
just turned away before reaching the American embassy.
66
 
Over the next year, the capital city continued to see demonstrations protesting the 
Iraq war and events in Palestine.  Protests began at major universities, including the 
important Islamic institution of al-Azhar, and also at professional syndicates, many of 
which are known for their ties to the Society of Muslim Brothers.
67
  The continuing 
protests were more staid than those of March 20 and 21.  They were fueled by 




In the fall of 2004 a new phenomenon, perhaps best described as a diffuse social 
movement, was born in Egypt.  The Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC), the central 
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organization in the loose association of political organizations identified by the popular 
slogan Kefaya! (Enough!), was founded by a group of individuals who represent a broad 
spectrum of politics in Egypt.
69
  The leadership of the EMC is principally composed of 
nationalists and leftists, but it includes men from across the Egyptian political spectrum.
70
  
The affiliated groups deepen the political, social and religious diversity of the EMC.
71
  
The common factor uniting the leadership of these groups is previous political 
experience; many were student leaders during the protests of the 1970s.
72
 
The EMC, along with associated groups, began staging demonstrations in 
December 2004.  The first of these was small, 500 to 1,000 protesters, but “it was the first 
rally ever convened solely to demand that Mubarak step down and refrain from handing 
over power to his son.”
73
  The organizations under the Kefaya umbrella continued to 
organize protests, with varying levels of success, in response to the actions of the regime 
over the next few years. 
During 2005, the organizations under the EMC and the Society of Muslim 
Brothers (SMB) occasionally coordinated to plan joint-protests.  The SMB, the largest 
opposition party, is “illegal but tolerated [and] has uneasy relations with the 
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  The SMB held a rally on March 27, which EMC members attended.  It 
was party‟s first-ever public criticism of Mubarak.  The state responded with force at the 
rally and imprisoned a number of the “middle generation” SMB leaders.  These 
individuals are known to be the strongest voices within the SMB in favor of cooperation 
with more secular opposition parties and movements.
75
  The relationship between the 
Brothers and the EMC waxed and waned over the next few years, but the state appeared 
concerned by the new level of criticism voiced by the illegal party and continued the 
heightened level of repression against the party‟s members.  In addition, the historic 
political success the party enjoyed in the 2005 parliamentary elections gave the regime 
another reason to continue to crackdown on the Brothers.
76
 
A variety of domestic events continued to fuel the contentious behavior of these 
groups between 2005 and 2008.  In 2005, a constitutional referendum, presidential and 
parliamentary elections provided a focus for the activities of protesters.  A second round 
of constitutional amendments in 2006, which appear to respond to the contentious politics 
of the preceding years, also precipitated a response from the social movements.
77
  In 
addition to electoral politics, textile workers engaged in a large number of strikes during 
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Journalists, working in print and other media, were both observers and 
participants in the contentious politics described above.  Demonstrators frequently 
gathered at professional syndicates; the Press Syndicate in particular, was a common 
locale for protests.  In Egypt, many opposition parties, as well as the NDP, publish 
newspapers.  Their reporters, therefore, are understood to be aligned with a particular 
political perspective.  Additionally, the role of the Internet is often discussed as an 
important facet in the rise of this protest culture.  EMC and SMB members have used 
blogs and Facebook to publicize and coordinate protest activities.  The political changes 
described above, then, are interconnected with the media environment and the state‟s 
perception of journalists. 
 
The Egyptian Media Environment: A period of flux and rising diversity 
As with the level of protests, the period of study is particularly vibrant in light of 
the variable relationship between the state and the Egyptian media across time.  
Additionally, 2004 marks the emergence of the political blogging phenomenon in Egypt; 
Suleiman began blogging in February 2004 and the EMC set up its website later in the 
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  This section will trace the relationship between the state and more 
traditional print and broadcast media and then turn to the developments of the Egyptian 
„blogosphere.‟ 
The Egyptian state‟s close relationship to the news media dates to the first Arabic 
language newspapers printed in the first half of the nineteenth century.
80
  A century later, 
during the interwar years, newspapers associated with political parties engaged in fierce 
criticism of one another, even if they did not question the raison d’être of the state.
81
  The 
Free Officers regime, who first took power in 1952, dramatically reduced the diversity of 
information in the print media.  The regime itself published most of the newspapers 
available after they took power.
82
 
Sadat loosened some restrictions on the press and Mubarak‟s government oversaw 
a marked increase in the vitality of the press.  Under Sadat, the government legalized 
opposition political parties and allowed them to publish their own newspapers.  The 
government licensed over 300 independent newspapers and magazines, many of which 
were published by religious organizations.
83
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Although the available forums for public speech and the acceptable topics 
expanded under Mubarak, limits on political speech remained in place.  The Emergency 
Laws enacted in 1981 after the assassination of Sadat remains in place.  These laws give 
Mubarak institutional justification to engage in “prepublication censorship, confiscation 
of newspapers, and [the] closing down of publications.”
84
  In 1995, the state amended the 
Penal Code and dramatically increased the punishment for journalists who published 
false or libelous information.  The state repealed this changed the following year in 
response to strong objections from the Press Syndicate.
85
  In Eberhard Kiele‟s estimation, 
however, the state bowed to the demands of the journalists only because “more discreet” 
methods of punishing offending journalists were in place.
86
  Another amendment to the 
Penal Code regarding journalists was passed in 2006; it limited the jail time to which 
judges may sentence journalists, but expanded the scope of journalistic crimes.
87
  The 
legal approach to „censorship‟ by the Egyptian state, while not its only tactic, has become 
increasingly prevalent since the mid-1990s.
88
 
Some publications circumvented the Egyptian government‟s restrictions on the 
media by registering their newspapers and magazines abroad.  A law predating the 1952 
Free Officers coup enabled publications denied licenses by the Mubarak regime to 
register in foreign countries.  The number independent Egyptian publications that choose 
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this path grew appreciably in the 1990s.  These publications, however, enjoyed a greater 
freedom to share information for only a short period of time.  In 1997 and 1998 the 




Broadcast media – television and radio – enjoy fewer freedoms than printed 
media, although changes also came to this segment of the media in the 1990s.  Hussein 
Amin posits that the lower level of freedom accorded to radio and television media, a 
trend seen across the Arab Middle East, is tied to literacy levels.
90
  Less than three 
quarters of Egyptian adults can read and write, yet all adults, as well as children, can 
consume television and radio broadcasts.
91
  As a result, Egypt and other states have come 
to rely primarily on these media to “promote their political, religious, cultural, and 
economic programs.”  The state continues to produce much of the radio and television 
content available in Egypt today.
92
 
The regime allowed increasing levels of commercialization of the television 
industry in the 1990s, as it did with print media.  The rationale for the commercialization 
seen in broadcast media has, in part, different reasons; the changes in television 
ownership coincided with the rise of satellite television, increasing the competition faced 
by Egyptian state television.  Commercialization of terrestrial broadcasting was followed 
by the birth of the first privately owned Egyptian satellite television station, Dream TV, 
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in 2001.  The state maintains a small share of ownership, likely around ten percent, in this 
station and the other satellite channels that emerged later.
93
 
Egypt connected to the Internet in the early 1990s, as satellite television was 
becoming popular.  The first official connection was made in 1993.  Four years later, in 
1997, the state allowed the public at large to connect to the Internet.
94
  In 2009, more than 
twelve and a half million Egyptians, or almost sixteen percent of the population, are 
Internet users.
95
  Moreover, Internet access is widely available in urban centers; Internet 
cafes are abundant and free, wireless Internet is available at every upscale, western-style 
café and at McDonalds in Cairo.  Finally, the information gathered and the ideas shared 
Egyptian bloggers reach a wider audience through the print media; some newspapers 
frequently cite bloggers in their stories, including al-Dustour, the newspaper for which 
Ibrahim Issa writes and edits.
96
 
Many Arab countries, like Egypt, were slow to provide Internet access to their 
general citizenry.  Also, many keep the price of connection artificially high to limit the 
number of people with the means to access the new medium.
97
  The wariness of these 
actions indicates that regimes in the region had concerns about their ability to control the 
information shared via the Internet.  Egypt, however, departs company from the majority 
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of its neighbors in two important ways; the government has made efforts to expand its 
citizens‟ access to the Internet and has not used filtering technology in any consistent 
manner. 
The Egyptian state surrendered the means of direct control over the Internet.  
Internet service providers (ISPs) are privately owned and operated, although a public-
sector company maintains control over “basic telecommunications.”
98
  The first private 




The Egyptian government continues to engage in programs aimed at expanding 
Internet access throughout the country.  In the mid- and late-1990s various government 
and international programs provided free access around the country and taught Egyptians 
to use the Internet.
100
  A decade later, Egypt implemented programs that provide low-cost 
computers to its citizens and provide dial-up Internet for only the cost of a phone call.  
Additionally, the government is testing a new technology that “could provide vast areas 
of the countryside with high-speed, wireless access.”
101
 
Unlike most Arab regimes Egypt has not engaged in any systematic blocking of 
the Internet to limit the online content that users within its borders are able to access.  The 
OpenNet Initiative, funded by a collection of academic centers focusing on the study of 
the Internet and politics, conducted tests in forty countries to determine if domestic or 
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international websites with controversial information were blocked.
102
  The researchers in 
Egypt, testing from different locations and across time, were able to access all the 
politically, socially and militarily sensitive websites on their list.  In short, Egyptian 
Internet users, unlike many of their Arab neighbors, are able to use any email provider 
they choose.  Additionally, they can read reports published by local and foreign NGOs 
about the human rights violations in Egypt and news reports about the territorial conflicts 
in southeast Egypt.  Internet users within the boundaries of the Egyptian state also have 
access to other sites access unavailable in other authoritarian countries.
103
 
There are reports which indicate unfettered access to the Internet in Egypt is 
already being circumscribed.  To date, the efforts by the regime appear to be temporary 
interruptions, targeted at political opposition groups.  The SMB maintains the 
government blocked access to its website, ikhwanonline.com, three times between 2004 
and 2007.  In 2007, the webmasters of the opposition party circumvented this restriction 
by changing the IP address associated with the URL of their website.
104
  In 2008, the 
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information corroborated the EMC‟s claim that one of 
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The Egyptian regime‟s attempts to control Internet use through intimidation and 
repression appear to be more common than the technological methods that surfaced 
recently.  The first cases recorded case in which Egypt used it coercive arm to punish 
Internet users who had violated „acceptable‟ parameters of social and political use 
occurred in 2001.
106
  A number of homosexual men, entrapped by the state, were among 
the early victims.
107
  The next year a new department was established within the Ministry 
of the Interior to search for online criminal activities, including journalists in violation of 
the country‟s strict libel laws.  The existence Department for Combating Computer and 
Internet Crimes, known colloquially as the “Internet police,” was not publicly announced 
until 2004, two years after its creation.
108
 
Quantifying the active political blogs in Egypt is an imprecise enterprise, as is 
generalizing about their authors.  The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, in a study 
of the Arab Blogosphere counted 35,000 active blogs, about a third of which are authored 
by Egyptians.  In a more detailed study of 4,000 of these blogs, the authors of this study 
confirmed the common wisdom that Arab bloggers are predominantly young men.
109
  
Many bloggers write primarily about their personal lives or non-political topics.  Marc 
Lynch estimated that were a few thousand political blogs in the Arab world in 2006.
110
  If 
                                               
106  Gamal Eid, “Egypt: A False Freedom” in The Internet In the Arab World: A New Space of 
Repression? available at: http://anhri.net/en/reports/net2004/egypt.shtml [last accessed: 3 Jul 2009] 
107  Ibid.; Kalathil and Boas, 123. 
108  Eid. 
109  Bruce Etling, John Kelly, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, “Mapping the Arab Blogosphere: Politics 
Culture and Dissent,” Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2009-06, 3-4, 15; Isherwood, 3. 







his estimation and the Berkman Center‟s study are correct, they indicate that 
approximately thousand active, politically-oriented bloggers in exist Egypt. 
The rise of blogging and the EMC in Egypt overlapped in 2004 and 2005.  Early 
bloggers in Egypt, like those in other places, often authored their blogs in English rather 
than Arabic and favored secular liberal political positions.  These individuals provided 
information on the EMC‟s early protests to western human rights organizations and 




The SMB bloggers emerged soon after those of Kefaya became popular.  These 
individuals began their blogs in response to state repression.  In 2005 and 2006 the state 
restricted access to public spaces at universities where the young Brothers had previously 
been active, in response some went online to share their thoughts.
112
  Interestingly, the 
Berkman Center study found that, of the 4,000 Arab blogs it closely examined, more 
Egyptian bloggers who express positions in favor of political Islam provide their real 
name (about 78%) than other subsets of Arab bloggers.
113
  Additionally, after the state 
began its crackdowns against the SMB, a number of blogs emerged that campaigned for 
the release of imprisoned SMB members.
114
 
The blogs have sometimes been a means of communication and exchange of ideas 
between the younger cohorts of the secular left and political Islam.  The members of the 
                                               
111  Isherwood, 1; Lynch (Feb 2007), 12; Radsch, 1-3. 
112  Isherwood, 5. 
113  Etling, et al., 19. 







SMB who blog are often more similar to their liberal counterparts than they are to the less 
affluent youth of the organization; they have Internet access and watch satellite 
television, many of the SMB bloggers also speak English or another European language 
and have travelled abroad.  These cultural similarities and shared opposition to the 
likelihood that Gamal Mubarak will succeed his father as the President of Egypt have 
kept some lines of communication open between these two camps.  Additionally, some 
bloggers are supportive of campaigns to release their fellow bloggers from prison.
115
  
Other SMB bloggers, however, have defined themselves against the Kefaya-aligned 
blogging community. The SMB bloggers see themselves as different with regard to 
ideology and also because they write in standard Arabic rather than for writing in English 
or Egyptian colloquial Arabic.
116
 
The relationship between opposition movements and blogging creates a particular 
problem in looking at instances of repression against journalists.  Isherwood warns his 
readers to recognize that bloggers who are arrested or otherwise harassed at protests are 
unlikely being targeted as bloggers.  Instead, they are being treated like their fellow 
protesters.  The blogging subgroup simply has a medium for sharing their stories that 
others with similar experiences do not.
117
  Yet, Isherwood alternately points out that 
association with activists is not the same as activism itself.  Wael Abbas writes one of the 
most popular political blogs in the Egyptian blogosphere and is often associated with the 
EMC, whose protests he has covered in detail on his blog with photographs and videos, 
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as well as text.  Isherwood describes Abbas‟ blog as “a favorite of opposition activists,” 




Counting Repression Against Journalists 
To test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter One, I gathered newswire stories of 
instances in which journalists experienced state repression in Egypt.  During the five 
years in question, 2004 through 2008, I found 60 cases of repression against journalists of 
all types in Egypt reported by the Associated Press (AP), Agence France Press (AFP) and 
United Press International (UPI).  In this section I examine the cases of the fourteen 
bloggers and 38 were newspaper reporters who experienced state repression during this 
period.  The eight television reporters who also experienced repression are excluded from 
the analysis below. 
Bloggers do not numerically out number journalists as victims of repression in 
Egypt between 2004 through 2008, but the state appears target those using the Internet to 
share information at a higher rate.  I estimate that there around a thousand active, 
politically-oriented Egyptian bloggers.  In the sphere of print media, it was recently 
reported that there are about 5,100 members of the Egyptian Press Syndicate.
119
  Print 
journalists outnumber bloggers roughly five to one, but as victims of reported repression 
the ratio falls to three to one.  The data collected from the wire service reports, suggests 
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that a greater percentage of bloggers experience state repression their counterparts in 
print journalism. 
I propose three hypotheses that might explain this trend.  In the first, I expected 
journalists and bloggers who are not embedded in state institutions would be targeted 
more than those who are embedded.  Two pieces of evidence lend support to this 
hypothesis.  In the five year period examined here, there was only one case of repression 
against a journalist at a state-controlled newspaper.  In 2004, Ahmed Ezzedin, a reporter 
for the weekly al-Usbu, was sentenced to two years in prison for accusing the Agriculture 
Minister of corruption.
120
  The state and the NDP control the content of papers such al-
Gumhuriya and al-Ahram, so it is unsurprising that their reporters do not experience 
repression.  Nonetheless, as the most embedded written media, if reporters from these 
papers did experience repression, it would be evidence against the hypothesis about the 
relationship between corporatism and repression. 
Additionally, foreign journalists have been targets of state repression.  The wire 
services report that two print journalist, one from the Los Angeles Times and the second 
from al-Sharq al-Awsat, experience repression at the hands of the Egyptian state.  
Additionally, three reporters for al-Jazeera – a foreign satellite channel – were among the 
eight television reporters excluded from the study.  These individuals are not embedded 
in the state; their editors, unworried about loosing the newspaper license to publish or the 
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station‟s license to broadcast, are unlikely to curb the writings of their journalists at the 
behest of the Egyptian state. 
In the second hypothesis I posit that the state requires information to target 
journalists; thus, those who write anonymously are less likely to experience repression.  
Among the cases gathered, only two bloggers sought to keep their identities hidden prior 
to experiencing repression.  Suleiman, who blogged as Kareem Amer, is one of the two 
bloggers who adopted a pseudonym.  Few journalists or bloggers appear to write 




The final hypothesis concerns the relationship journalists and bloggers might 
maintain with social movements and opposition parties.  Variations in the number of 
repressive actions reported across time provide some evidence in support of this 
hypothesis.  This dataset begins in 2004, the year in which blogging and the EMC emerge 
as political phenomena in Egypt.  The rise in reprisals against journalists and bloggers 
appears to be tied to the emergence of the EMC and the period of contentious politics that 
this group initiated.  The social movement was started in December 2004; less than six 
percent of the instances of repression happened in 2004.  Fourteen instances of 
repression, the highest annual rate, were reported by the wire services in each 2006 and 
2007. 
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Data compiled from Lexis-Nexis searches of the Associated Press, Agence France Press, and United Press 
International for stories about “journalists” and “bloggers” in Egypt between 01 January 2004 and 31 
December 2008. 
 
Additionally, the instances of repression cluster around periods of active 
contentious politics.  More than one third of these cases occurred in just two of the sixty 
months examined in this study.  Eight cases of repression (15%) were recorded in May 
2006, when opposition forces held protests relating to the constitutional amendments 
passed in that year.  Nine cases of repression (17%) were reported in September 2007; 
textile workers held major strikes in this month. 
Studying journalists and bloggers affiliated with social movements and opposition 
parties raises a number of concerns.  Specifically it raises the question:  Where is the line 







journalist‟s presence at a rally makes it difficult to identify the reason the individual 
experienced repression; a journalist or blogger might be repressed at a protest irrespective 
of their published writings.  With this in mind, I have excluded those reported instances 
of repression where journalists and bloggers were treated like those who surrounded them 
at a protest.  Even with this cautionary correction, just over fifteen percent of the fifty two 
print journalists and bloggers were repressed while present at a protest or strike.  This 
evidence provides some tentative support for the argument that journalists and bloggers 
allied with social movements experience higher levels of repression than their non-
aligned counterparts. 
Finally, I highlight an interesting and unexpected finding concerning the type of 
repression used by the state.  Among all cases of repression, extra-legal arrest under the 
State of Emergency and legal action are equally common.  For those 52 cases concerning 
print journalists and bloggers, sixty percent are subject to legal action but only forty are 
arrested.  These two forms of repression are not mutually exclusive, but it appears that 
there is little overlap.  The state, often fails to enforce the prison sentences of journalists, 
indicating that the trials serve as punishment in and of themselves.  Moreover, the state 
may use trials as a warning to other journalists about what lines should not be crossed. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, a review of the political and media environments in Egypt and an 
analysis of the data have highlighted a number of important points.  The state allowed 







particular, have brought swift changes to the ways in which information is shared Egypt.  
Additionally, opposition forces like the EMC and the SMB in Egypt are taking advantage 
of this new and dynamic media environment to make themselves heard. 
The Egyptian state, however, has maintained a firm hand over journalists in this 
period.  Repression is one tool through which the regime controls the spread of 
information.  The analysis of news wire reports from 2004 through 2008 indicates that 
those who choose to share information on a blog are more frequently targeted by the state 
than those who write for the traditional print media.  Moreover, it appears that journalists 
embedded in state institutions experience fewer instances of repression, while those 
associated with opposition groups experience more instances of repression.  Finally, 
legal, rather than violent, tools of intimidation appear to be increasingly favored by the 
state as means to control the spread of information. 
The significance of these findings and their implications for future research will 









Chapter 3: Conclusions and areas for future research 
The actions of the Egyptian government, described above, demonstrate that the 
authoritarian regime recognizes some degree of truth in Napoleon‟s cautionary quip 
about the relative power of newspapers and bayonets.  The stories of independent 
journalists, like Ibrahim Issa, and bloggers, like Abdel Karem Nabil Suleiman, depict part 
of the state‟s attempt to quiet those who violate the norms of speech.  This paper explored 
the Egyptian state‟s treatment of bloggers and print journalists.  In this chapter I briefly 
review the theoretical claims and the evidence presented in the above chapters.  Then, I 
address some of the implications of these findings in Egypt and in a wider international 
context. 
 
Summary: Arguments and evidence 
This paper is motivated by the CPJ finding that bloggers and others who use the 
Internet to share information composed the worldwide plurality of imprisoned media 
workers at the end of 2008.  My hypotheses to explain this trend in repression rely on two 
literatures from within political science.  The first hypothesis is derived from works on 
enduring authoritarianism.  Authors like Eva Bellin explain that regimes incorporate 









  I, therefore, expect journalists and bloggers who work for publications that are 
part of the state‟s corporate structures will be more insulated from repression. 
The remaining hypotheses are built upon works about civil war and movement 
repression.  An army or repressive state must have access to information about offenders 
before they target a particular journalist or blogger.  Thus, I expect journalists and 
bloggers who publish their writings anonymously to be more insulated from repression.  
Additionally, Christian Davenport has found that as social movements increase the tactics 
they use to challenge the regime, levels of repression increase in turn.
123
  One of the 
tactics available to social movements are methods for spreading information, like 
newspapers and blogs.  I, therefore, expect reporters and bloggers who publish in support 
of social movements to experience higher levels of repression. 
My examination of Egypt from 2004 through 2008 supports the international 
snapshot CPJ captured in its 2008 report.  The English-language news wire coverage of 
repression against journalists in Egypt indicates that a smaller percentage of Egyptian 
print journalists were victims of repression than Egyptian bloggers during this period.  
Additionally, there is some support for the hypothesis that corporatism offers journalists 
and bloggers insulation from repression, while affiliation with a social movement or 
opposition party opens these individuals to repression.  Finally, the Egyptian state 
frequently used court proceedings to censure journalists and bloggers.  In many of these 
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cases, however, the state chose not to enforce the jail sentences that accompanied the 
guilty verdicts. 
 
Egypt in Context:  Technology, contentious politics and legal repression 
Comparing broad trends in the forms of Internet use and the nature of repression 
and institutions across the Middle East and around the world, enables a fuller picture of 
the relationship between repression and institutions and indicates areas fruitful for further 
research.  Variations can be seen in the permissiveness of different media environments 
generally.  More specifically, the Internet penetration varies widely across authoritarian 
countries, as do government efforts to limit access to politically sensitive content.  Social 
movements and opposition parties have employed the Internet to differing degrees, 
irrespective of Internet usage rates.  Finally, the use of the legal system as mechanism for 
cracking down on free speech does not appear to be only an Egyptian trend, although the 
ways in which other authoritarian governments are using the courts follow a somewhat 
different pattern. 
Internet access often seems ubiquitous in North America and Western Europe, yet 
even in the first world a quarter to a third of people are not online.  Variations in Internet 
penetration vary even more widely in the third world.  In comparison to other Arab 
countries, Egypt falls at the low end of Internet penetration along with Algeria, Syria, 
Oman, and Palestine where slightly more than one in ten people have access to the 
Internet.  The Gulf States, where larger segments of the population have significant 











Internet usage is similarly wide in other regions where authoritarian regimes are 
the predominate system of government.  Countries in East and Southeast Asia are 
compared to those of the Middle East.  While a quarter of Chinese are online, nearly a 
third of Malaysians and Singaporeans have Internet access.  Indonesians use the Internet 
at a rate similar to that of Egyptians.  The world‟s lowest levels of Internet penetration 




The percentage of Internet users in a country, however, is not the only 
determinant of how much this medium affects the spread of information.  Some 
countries, like Egypt, have kept prices artificially high to discourage access while 
allowing those who can afford to get online the freedom to consume and share all types 
of information.  Other countries, Saudi Arabia and China chief among them, rely instead 
upon complex technologies to restrict the types of information available to the Internet 
users in their borders.  The technological filtering approach to limiting access to online 
information can, of course be circumvented.  The most cutting edge technological filters 
can be expensive.  Additionally, they require constant updates to stay abreast of the latest 
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means of circumventing the blocks.  No block is fool-proof, but as these regimes seem to 
recognize, they do limit the access of the average user.
126
 
Even where Internet users have relatively unfettered access to the Internet, 
political usage cannot be assumed.  The vast majority of Internet users simply go online 
to stay in touch with friends and family and in search of entertainment.  While in all 
countries, political uses of the Internet are a small portion of online behavior of a 
population in some places social movements, opposition parties and individuals have 
harnessed the new tools at their disposal to challenge existing political norms. 
In the Middle East, Iraqi bloggers – Salam Pax the author of Where is Raed? and 
Riverbend the author of Baghdad Burning – shared impacts of the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq.
127
  Lebanese bloggers, also told their stories, during the war with Israel in the 
summer of 2006.  Bahraini and Kuwait bloggers, like their Egyptian counterparts, have 
challenged state policies, organized protests and possible altered the course of politics in 
their countries.  The Bahraini bloggers, it should be noted, have endeavored to maintain 
their anonymity even as they organize and attend protests, potentially providing a more 
fruitful case for examining the hypothesis about information, or more particularly its 
absence, and the levels of repression.
128
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Malaysia and Singapore are other countries where opponents of the regimes in 
these two states have engaged in online “contentious journalism.”
129
  Additionally, these 
two regimes have increasingly relied on the legal system to punish journalists.  As in 
Egypt, the Singaporean government has deployed the legal system against print media as 
well as Internet journalists.  Singapore and Malaysia have Sedition Acts that allow for the 
prosecution of anyone spreading anti-state information, broadly defined.
130
  The state has 
made particular use of the legal system to punish foreign publications, and their reporters, 
including the Asian Wall Street Journal.
131
  While George admits that these laws may 
have encouraged many in the main stream, domestic media to engage in self-censorship.  
He also notes that the most severe applications of these laws have been against 




Most of the bloggers and others who use the Internet to engage in contentious 
politics would appear to fall somewhere in between the categories of “professional 
journalists” and “opposition members.”  Given the threats they face, we might ask: why 
does this behavior emerge in some countries and not others?  Surely limits to access, be 
they financial or technological, and threats of sanction, be they violent or legal, play a 
role in determining when the use of the Internet becomes a key mechanism for 
challenging the state.  Other factors, such as the strength of opposition movements and 
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social movements likely matter as well.  When are some of these determinants more 
important than others? 
The rising prevalence of the judicial system in meting out punishment to 
journalists and bloggers is not the only area where the courts are garnering more 
attention.  Nathan Brown and Mona El-Ghobashy examine how Egyptian citizens use the 
courts to challenge the state.
133
  Additionally, Brown argues that that state uses the courts 
to spread the power of the central state across the state strongly and evenly.
134
  The 
exceptional instances in which the regime uses the courts to punish journalists, however, 
do not fall into either of these categories.  What does the regime gain from this 
„judicialization‟ of repression?  The public nature of these trials, as opposed to the much 
more opaque instances of extra-judicial repression, indicates that their impacts on media 
workers, and on the public at large, might be different.  The questions about the social 
movements, the legal system and repression that the findings of this paper offer fruitful 
areas for future research. 
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